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1  | MR . R
Five days before Christmas in 1999, Mr. R, a 26‐year‐old graduate of the 
University of Waterloo with a promising career in robotics, and his girl‐
friend drove away from his grandfather’s house in Sarnia, Ontario.1 At 
once, an otherwise normal day in the holiday season became a ca‐
tastrophe. Their car was struck by a police vehicle responding to an 
emergency call. The police officer and Mr. R’s girlfriend suffered minor 
injuries, but Mr. R’s injuries were devastating. Neuroimaging showed 
herniation, bleeding, and contusions in his left parietal and temporal 
lobes. In the days to follow, he was unable to open his eyes or produce 
sound. Mr. R. remained in the hospital for 1 month and was then dis‐
charged into the care of his parents to recover at home.
In the ensuing 12 years, Mr. R was assessed regularly by neurol‐
ogists. They diagnosed him as being in a vegetative state, a condition 
of wakeful unresponsiveness.2 Their clinical exams, using techniques 
such as the JFK Coma Recovery Scale–Revised, demonstrated that 
Mr. R had semi‐regular sleep–wake cycles but no awareness of him‐
self or his environment. Between 2012 and 2013, 20 clinical exams 
were performed by specialized healthcare professionals. Each exam 
1 Case	adapted	from:	Fernández‐Espejo,	D.,	&	Owen,	A.	M.	(2013).	Detecting	awareness	
after severe brain injury. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14(11),	801–809;	Owen	A.	M.	
(2017).	How science found a way to help coma patients communicate. Retrieved from https :// 
www.thegu	ardian.com/news/2017/sep/05/how‐scien	ce‐found‐a‐way‐to‐help‐coma‐ 
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Abstract
This article provides an ethical analysis of the U.S. practice guideline update on dis‐
orders of consciousness. Our analysis focuses on the guideline’s recommendations 
regarding the use of investigational neuroimaging methods to assess brain‐injured 
patients. Complex and multifaceted ethical issues have emerged because these 
methods alter the clinical understanding of consciousness. We address issues of false 
hope, patient suffering, and cost. We argue that, in spite of these concerns, there 
is significant benefit to using neuroimaging to assess brain‐injured patients in most 
cases.
K E Y W O R D S
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produced the same results. Mr. R showed no behavioral responses to 
commands—such as “raise your right arm”—and no behavioral re‐
sponses to visual, tactile, auditory, or noxious stimuli. His condition 
differed from that of the minimally conscious state. Patients in the 
minimally conscious state have semi‐regular sleep–wake cycles, as 
Mr. R did, but, unlike him, they display intermittent behavioral evi‐
dence of awareness.3
In February 2012, Mr. R.’s parents enrolled him in a study at the 
University of Western Ontario to discover whether functional neu‐
roimaging could detect awareness in persons with catastrophic brain 
injuries. While lying in the scanner, he was instructed to imagine one 
of two activities—playing tennis or visiting the rooms of his home—
for repeated 30‐second intervals. In fully conscious persons, imagin‐
ing these activities preferentially activates different brain structures. 
The finding of sustained and predictable brain activity in these re‐
gions is interpreted as a proxy for behavioral command‐following.4 
Remarkably, Mr. R’s brain activity matched that of fully conscious 
persons, suggesting that he was aware of his surroundings.
Investigators then adapted this method to assess whether Mr. 
R. could communicate. They asked a series of yes/no questions. To 
answer “yes,” Mr. R was asked to imagine playing tennis. To answer 
“no,” he was asked to imagine visiting the rooms of his home. Mr. R 
correctly answered questions regarding his name, the name of his 
support	worker	 (whom	he	 had	met	 following	 his	 injury),	 the	 date,	
and his location. Additionally, Mr. R. was asked whether he still en‐
joyed watching ice hockey on the television, an activity that he had 
enjoyed prior to his accident. He was even asked twice whether he 
was in physical pain, to which, each time, he replied “no.”
These results were revolutionary. They demonstrated that, de‐
spite being consistently diagnosed as being in the vegetative state 
for 12 years, Mr. R. was conscious. Mr. R was alive inside.
The recently issued U.S. practice guideline update for disorders 
of	consciousness	(DoC)	aims	to	improve	the	care	and	management	of	
patients like Mr. R.5 This joint effort by the American Academy of 
Neurology, the American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine, and 
the	 National	 Institute	 on	 Disability,	 Independent	 Living,	 and	
Rehabilitation Research recommends how clinicians can use ad‐
vancements in neuroscience to improve the care of their patients. 
The guideline is the product of a multi‐year consensus process and 
evidence‐based review, derived from the 2011 American Academy 
of Neurology process manual.6 To ensure that recommendations re‐
flect the highest degree of analytical rigor, the manual specifies 
strict inclusion criteria for studies.7
The	standard	method	of	diagnosis	of	DoC	patients	is	the	clinical	
exam. Clinicians use one of several neurobehavioral scales to elicit 
the following behaviors: reproducible responses to visual, auditory, 
or noxious stimuli; object recognition and use; command‐following; 
or communication.8 Evidence of one or more of these behaviors is 
regarded as a marker of consciousness and diagnostic of the mini‐
mally conscious state. There is not, however, consensus internation‐
ally	 regarding	 scale	 standardization.	 Variation	 persists	 regarding	
which scale should be used, the optimal frequency of clinical exam‐
ination, and the training needed to use a scale correctly.
This has led to two serious diagnostic problems. The first is misdiag‐
nosis due to human error. Although there are discrepancies regarding 
the rate of clinical misdiagnosis,9 one of the most extensive studies of 
this problem found that as many as 41% of patients diagnosed as being 
in the vegetative state according to an unstandardized method—diag‐
nosis by consensus among the clinical team—could be misclassified. 
When examined with the clinically validated JFK Coma Recovery Scale–
Revised, these patients were reclassified as minimally conscious.10 This 
suggests that use of unstandardized, non‐clinically validated methods 
could lead clinicians to underestimate the presence of consciousness in 
nearly half of patients thought to be in a vegetative state.
Second,	there	is	a	proportion	of	DoC	patients	in	whom	standardized	
neurobehavioral scales are insensitive to preserved consciousness. These 
patients, like Mr. R, are consistently diagnosed as being in a vegetative 
state according to rigorous clinical examination, but they are demonstra‐
bly conscious when assessed with neuroimaging or electroencephalogra‐
phy	(EEG).	A	meta‐analysis	of	six	studies	using	the	methods	applied	to	Mr.	
R	demonstrated	that	42	of	292	DoC	patients	(14.4%)	who	were	entirely	
unresponsive at the bedside could modulate their brain activity to com‐
mand.11 These patients are variously referred to as “covertly conscious”12 









Implementation Subcommittee of the American Academy of Neurology; the American 
Congress	of	Rehabilitation	Medicine;	and	the	National	Institute	on	Disability,	
Independent Living, and Rehabilitation Research. Neurology, 91(10),	450–460.
6 Gronseth	G.	S.,	Woodroffe,	L.	M.,	&	Getchius,	T.	S.	(2011).	American Academy of 
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scales for disorders of consciousness: Evidence‐based recommendations for clinical 
practice and research. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 91(12),	1795–1813.
9 Wade,	D.	T.	(2018).	How	often	is	the	diagnosis	of	the	permanent	vegetative	state	
incorrect? A review of the evidence. European Journal of Neurology, 25(4),	619–625.
10 Schnakers,	C.,	Vanhaudenhuyse,	A.,	Giacino,	J.	T.,	Ventura,	M.,	Boly,	M.,	Majerus,	S.,	…	
Laureys,	S.	(2009).	Diagnostic	accuracy	of	the	vegetative	and	minimally	conscious	state:	Clinical	
consensus versus standardized neurobehavioral assessment. BMC Neurology, 9(35),	1–5.
11 Kondziella,	D.,	Friberg,	C.	K.,	Frokjaer,	V.	G.,	Fabricius,	M.,	&	Møller,	K.	(2016).	
Preserved consciousness in vegetative and minimal conscious states: Systematic review 
and meta‐analysis. JNNP, 87(5),	485–492.
12 Peterson,	A.,	&	Bayne,	T.	(2018).	Post‐comatose	disorders	of	consciousness.	In	R.	
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manifest in brain activity, not in overt behavior, and neuroimaging or EEG 
are the only methods by which their consciousness is revealed.
The guideline includes ambitious recommendations to address 
these problems. Not only does the guideline recommend using stan‐
dardized, clinically validated scales for diagnosis, but it also describes 
when neuroimaging and EEG methods may be used to complement 
clinical assessment. For example: recommendation 2e states that 
investigational neuroimaging and EEG methods may be used when 
serial clinical exams yield “inconclusive findings;” recommendation 
2f states that such methods may be used to justify the continuation 
of “active rehabilitation management;” and recommendation 5 states 
that such methods may be used for prognosis.
These recommendations represent a revolution in the practice 
of neurology and rehabilitation medicine. Although standardized 
neurobehavioral scales are still regarded as the gold standard for 
diagnosis, they are no longer considered the sole window into a pa‐
tient’s consciousness. Instead, investigational methods that measure 
consciousness directly from the brain are now one step closer to 
being	incorporated	in	the	routine	assessment	of	DoC	patients.	These	
methods could substantially improve clinical decision‐making, pain 
management, and rehabilitation.
The guideline’s endorsement of neuroimaging methods presents 
an opportunity to revisit perennial ethical concerns associated with 
DoC	patients	 and	 the	 nuances	 of	 translating	 these	 investigational	
methods into clinical practice. Evidence of consciousness following 
brain injury can inform ethically fraught decisions, such as whether 
to continue artificial nutrition, hydration, and mechanical ventilation, 
or how to treat complications such as pneumonia or sepsis years 
after injury. Owing to their relatively nascent evidence base, how‐
ever, the guideline qualifies the use of neuroimaging and EEG: they 
may be used only if they have a favorable harm–benefit ratio and a 
favorable cost–benefit ratio.14 But how should clinicians, families, or 
other stakeholders interpret this qualification? In this article, we 
build on previous work15 by providing an ethical analysis of the use 
of	investigational	neuroimaging	in	DoC	patients.	We	put	to	one	side	
harms normally associated with neuroimaging, such as a reaction to 
contrast agents, or blood pressure changes associated with a prone 
scanning posture. Instead, we focus on broader ethical issues associ‐
ated with how investigational neuroimaging and EEG might come to 
alter the clinical understanding of consciousness.
We begin with a brief overview of the neuroimaging meth‐
ods highlighted in the guideline. We introduce several conceptual 
distinctions to categorize these methods based on their task design 
and the underlying theory that supports the ascription of conscious‐
ness to a patient from measured brain activity. We then address 
three ethical issues: false hope, patient suffering, and cost. Our 
frame of reference for engaging these issues is a North American 
perspective. Nevertheless, these issues touch deep conceptual puz‐
zles that are not unique to any particular jurisdiction or healthcare 
system. Rather, they turn on how investigational neuroimaging is be‐
ginning to revolutionize our very understanding of consciousness. 
We defend the use of investigational neuroimaging methods against 
these concerns and introduce a number of practical recommenda‐
tions to mitigate harms and costs, where present. For clarity, our 
analysis focuses on the use of investigational neuroimaging, as these 
methods currently have a stronger evidence base than that of EEG 
methods. However, the arguments developed below are intended to 
apply	to	both	neuroimaging	and	EEG	(as	well	as	to	other	modalities).
2  | THE VALUE OF USING NEUROIMAGING 
TO A SSESS DOC PATIENTS
Investigational	neuroimaging	methods	used	to	assess	DoC	patients	
fit into one of two categories: active paradigms and passive para‐
digms.16 Active paradigms involve a study design that requires par‐
ticipants to engage in a mental task. These methods, like the clinical 
exam, assume that agency is a marker of consciousness.17 Just as 
raising one’s arm in response to a command is believed to be strong 
evidence of consciousness, so too is willful brain modulation. The 
representation of consciousness in active paradigms is thus similar 
to that of clinical exams. A patient is regarded as conscious because 
she is behaving, albeit only mentally, in a way that requires con‐
sciousness. Her mental behavior is not regarded as a reflex.
The most intensely studied active paradigm highlighted in the guide‐
line	is	the	functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(fMRI)	mental	imagery	
task. As described in the case of Mr. R, the mental imagery task requires 
participants to imagine activities for repeated and sustained 30‐second 
intervals, interspersed with periods of rest. Imagining playing tennis acti‐
vates the supplementary motor area, while imagining visiting the rooms 
of a home activates the parahippocampal gyrus, posterior parietal lobe, 
and lateral premotor cortex. These networks are anatomically distinct 
and their activation patterns are easily observed and differentiated. Two 
of the broadest fMRI mental imagery task studies to date found that as 
many	as	17%	of	participants	clinically	diagnosed	as	being	in	a	vegetative	
state could willfully modulate their brain activity to command.18 The 
14 Giacino	et	al.,	op.	cit.	note	5,	table	1	legend.	These	qualifications	also	extend	to	other	
health interventions described in the guideline.
15 Fins,	J.	J.,	&	Bernat,	J.	L.	(2018).	Ethical,	palliative,	and	policy	considerations	in	
disorders of consciousness. Neurology, 91(10),	471–475;	Fins	J.	J.,	Illes,	J.,	Bernat,	J.	L.,	
Hirsch,	J.,	Laureys,	S.,	&	Murphy,	E.	(2008).	Neuroimaging	and	disorders	of	conscious‐
ness: Envisioning an ethical research agenda. AJOB, 8(9),	3–12;	Weijer,	C.,	Peterson,	A.,	
Webster,	F.,	Graham,	M.,	Cruse,	D.,	Fernández‐Espejo,	D.,	…	Owen,	A.M.	(2014).	The	
ethics of neuroimaging after serious brain injury. BMC Medical Ethics, 15(41),	1–13;	Jox,	R.	
J.,	Bernat,	J.	L.,	Laureys,	S.,	&	Racine,	E.	(2012).	Disorders	of	consciousness:	Responding	
to requests for novel diagnostic and therapeutic interventions. Lancet Neurology, 11(8),	
732–738;	Kaal,	K.	J.,	Harrison,	M.,	Whitehurst,	D.	G.,	Townson,	A.,	Dance,	D.,	Stoessl	A.	
J.,	&	Illes,	J.	(2018).	Operationalizing	neuroimaging	for	disorders	of	consciousness	in	the	
Canadian context. Canadian Journal of Neurological Sciences, 45(6),	633–635.
16 Peterson	&	Bayne,	op.	cit.	note	12.
17 Bayne,	T.	(2013).	Agency	as	a	marker	of	consciousness.	In	A.	Clark,	J.	Kiverstein	&	T.	






precision of PET imaging and functional MRI in disorders of consciousness: A clinical 
validation study. Lancet, 384(9942),	514–522.
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mental imagery task has also been successfully adapted to incorporate 
different imagined activities, such as rock climbing and swimming,19 and 
has been applied with both fMRI and high‐density EEG.20
Although the mental imagery task is broadly regarded as the gold 
standard	 for	 investigational	 neuroimaging	 assessment	 of	DoC	 pa‐
tients, the task’s cognitive demands could increase the likelihood of 
false	 negatives.	 For	 example,	 Monti	 and	 colleagues	 (2010)	 found	
that only 1 of 31 minimally conscious‐state patients enrolled in their 
study	could	perform	the	task,	and	Stender	and	colleagues	(2014)	had	
similar difficulties in eliciting positive results from participants 
known to be conscious through clinical measures. To address this 
issue, investigators have modified active paradigms to reduce their 
cognitive demands and minimize the possibility of a false negative 
result.	Naci	 and	colleagues	 (2013)	observed	 that	 requiring	partici‐
pants to selectively attend to an auditory stimulus, such as instances 
of their own name, enhanced the neuronal representation of atten‐
tion, which could serve as a proxy for mental imagery in patients 
with impaired cognition. A study involving 15 healthy participants 
and	3	DoC	patients	demonstrated	that	all	participants	could	modu‐
late a canonical attention network when counting the number of 
times they heard their own name.21 Importantly, the guideline does 
not reference this investigational method, as the study’s sample size 
does not meet the inclusion criteria for the evidence‐based review. 
Nevertheless, this study highlights the diligence of clinical research‐
ers in optimizing active paradigms for the clinic.
A second investigational method utilizes a ‘passive’ neuroimag‐
ing paradigm. Passive paradigms measure brain activity as partici‐
pants are at rest or passively exposed to a stimulus. Passive 
paradigms turn on a distinct assumption about the relationship 
between brain activity and consciousness. Whereas active para‐
digms are designed to elicit evidence of agency, passive paradigms 
are designed to elicit brain activity that is believed to be closely 
associated	 with	 a	 conscious	 state	 (e.g.,	 being	 awake,	 asleep,	 or	
under	general	anesthesia)	or	a	circumscribed	feature	of	conscious	
processing	(e.g.,	conscious	visual	processing).22 The representation 
of consciousness through passive paradigms thus requires investi‐
gators to accept certain background assumptions. Much like a bio‐
marker of disease, one must accept that there is a correlational, if 
not a causal, relationship between consciousness and the neuronal 
mechanism measured.




in metabolic rates between patients clinically diagnosed as vegetative 
and minimally conscious are observed in the frontoparietal associative 
cortices.23 These findings are consistent with frontoparietal hypome‐
tabolism observed in healthy individuals under general anesthesia or 
in	deep	sleep.	In	a	clinical	validation	study	involving	126	DoC	patients,	
Stender	and	colleagues	observed	that	FDG	PET	had	high	overall	con‐
gruence with the JFK Coma Recovery Scale–Revised and high sensi‐
tivity to the clinical diagnosis of the minimally conscious state.24 
Moreover, changes in cortical metabolism also tracked patient out‐
come 12 months after assessment. Preserved frontoparietal metabo‐
lism was correlated with positive outcomes, while frontoparietal 
hypometabolism was correlated with negative outcomes.
The above‐reviewed methods are still regarded as investiga‐
tional,	yet	their	continued	success	in	detecting	consciousness	in	DoC	
patients suggests that they could benefit the care of patients. First, 
these methods could improve diagnostic accuracy. Neurological 
conditions secondary to the loss of consciousness, such as hyper‐
tonia, might prevent accurate assessment with neurobehavioral 
scales. Hypertonia causes muscle tightness, which can prevent a 
patient from complying with behavioral commands even if she is 
otherwise	conscious.	 In	other	DoC	patients,	 like	Mr.	R,	damage	to	
corticothalamic pathways could prevent motor output altogether. 
Investigational neuroimaging methods could improve diagnostic ac‐
curacy in both such patient subgroups.
Second, investigational neuroimaging could also improve prog‐
nostication. Predicting outcome following brain injury is difficult. 
DoC	patients	who	have	suffered	a	cardiac	arrest	are	unlikely	to	re‐
cover if they lack pupillary reflexes and somatosensory evoked po‐
tentials	bilaterally,	and	their	EEG	voltage	is	below	20	µV.25 Outcome 
associated with traumatic etiology, however, is variable, and some 
patients can recover years after injury. Accurate prognosis is import‐
ant as most decisions to withdraw life‐sustaining therapies, which 
are	informed	by	clinical	exams,	occur	within	the	first	72	hours	of	in‐
jury.26 Recommendation 5 of the guideline suggests that neuroimag‐
ing assessment of a patient’s auditory processing 2 to 3 months after 
injury could be predictive of recovery.27 Likewise, measurement of 
19 Bardin,	J.	C.,	Fins,	J.	J.,	Katz,	D.	I.,	Hersh,	J.,	Heier,	L.	A.,	…	Voss,	H.	U.	(2011).	
Dissociations	between	behavioural	and	functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging‐based	
evaluations of cognitive function after brain injury. Brain, 134(3),	769–782.
20 Goldfine,	A.	M.,	Victor,	J.	D.,	Conte,	M.	M.,	Bardin,	J.	C.,	&	Schiff,	N.	D.	(2011).	
Determination	of	awareness	in	patients	with	severe	brain	injury	using	EEG	power	





with acute brain injury. New England Journal of Medicine, 380(26),	2497–2505.
21 Naci,	L.,	&	Owen,	A.	M.	(2013).	Making	every	word	count	for	nonresponsive	










acutely comatose patients. Brain, 139(1),	292–299.
26 Turgeon,	A.	F.,	Lauzier,	F.,	Simard,	J.	F.,	Scales,	D.	C.,	Burns,	K.	E.	A.,	Moore,	L.,	…,	
Fergusson,	D.	(2011).	Mortality	associated	with	withdrawal	of	life‐sustaining	therapy	for	
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cortical metabolism could also predict positive from poor outcomes, 
or serve to gatekeep active rehabilitation management.
Third, neuroimaging assessment might also be therapeutic. 
Although not discussed in the guideline, it is possible that, in the fu‐
ture, these techniques could be used as cognitive prosthetics. The 
mental imagery task can be adapted for yes/no communication. To 
date,	 at	 least	 three	 DoC	 patients	 have	 communicated	 with	 this	
method.28 This application requires further technical refinement, 
but	it	shows	promise.	Some	theorists	have	considered	whether	DoC	
patients might participate in some medical decisions that impact 
their quality of life.29 The fact that a patient can communicate with 
the aid of neuroimaging does not imply that she has decision‐making 
capacity. Nevertheless, opening a channel of communication raises 
this	 possibility.	 The	 increase	 in	 agency	 afforded	 to	 DoC	 patients	
could be beneficial to them, or to surrogates and clinicians who 
might wish for patient input while making clinical decisions.
The potential benefits of investigational neuroimaging must be 
tempered by considering how the results might be understood by 
decision‐makers. Active paradigms and passive paradigms represent 
consciousness differently, and this complicates whether and how 
consciousness can be inferred from the data. Active paradigms are 
conceptually similar to clinical exams in that they are designed to 
elicit behaviors that require consciousness. Passive paradigms rep‐
resent consciousness differently. For passive paradigms, the ascrip‐
tion of consciousness hinges entirely on assumptions regarding the 
association between consciousness and a neuronal mechanism. This 
inference might be difficult for decision‐makers to comprehend. A 
patient’s family might be told that she is aware because her cortical 
metabolism is consistent with that of the minimally conscious state, 
but without other familiar evidence of consciousness, the value of 
this information might not be fully appreciated.
To sharpen this point, consider the broadly influential legal case 
involving Terri Schiavo.30 Suppose that investigational neuroimaging 
methods were available to inform the legal dispute between Ms. 
Schiavo’s family and husband over the removal of life‐sustaining 
therapies. Ms. Schaivo's husband, Michael Schiavo, petitioned the 
courts to remove her feeding tube so that she would be allowed to 
die, but her parents, Robert and Mary Schindler, objected to this pe‐
tition, arguing that their daughter was conscious and that the re‐
moval of food and fluids was inconsistent with her Roman Catholic 
values. Although it is unlikely that Ms. Schiavo would have been re‐
sponsive to these methods given what is known from autopsy find‐
ings, the prospect of using them in similar cases raises several 
important questions. Would a positive response to neuroimaging 
have had any influence? Would Ms. Schiavo’s husband have recon‐
sidered	his	decision	to	withdraw	life‐sustaining	therapies	if	FDG	PET	
had revealed that her cortical metabolism was consistent with that 
of the minimally conscious state? Further, how would the court have 
interpreted this information? Suppose Ms. Schiavo had performed 
the mental imagery task but showed no behavioral evidence of 
awareness. Would the court have then been inclined to support her 
parents wish to continue life‐sustaining therapies? These questions 
suggest that the translation of these methods to clinical services will 
likely have complex implications for decision‐makers. Not only is it 
unclear how decision‐makers would interpret these findings, but it is 
also unclear whether these methods should inform all, or only some, 
clinical decisions.
Investigational neuroimaging methods also raise complex issues 
regarding validity.31 As reviewed above, the mental imagery task is 
cognitively demanding. This raises questions regarding false nega‐
tive	results.	Investigators	observe	that	FDG	PET	is	more	sensitive	to	
preserved consciousness than the mental imagery task, but this 
claim may fail to account for the underlying theoretical differences 
between	 active	 and	 passive	 paradigms.	 FDG	 PET	 may	 indeed	 be	
more sensitive to consciousness, but this assertion requires one to 
presume that cortical metabolism of a particular kind is demonstra‐
tive of consciousness. This presumption is in tension with the ortho‐
dox clinical view that agency—not cortical metabolism—is a marker 
of consciousness.32 These considerations suggest that, like clinical 
exams, investigational neuroimaging methods might also be subject 
to	error.	Ethical	guidance	in	thinking	about	DoCs	under	conditions	of	
uncertainty could assist decision‐makers as they interpret neuroim‐
aging data.33
Should investigational neuroimaging methods be used to assess 
patients like Mr. R? We think so. But we acknowledge that the ben‐
efit of these methods must be weighed against potential harms and 
costs. How, then, should clinicians, families, and other stakehold‐
ers decide when the value of investigational neuroimaging is worth 
these harms and costs? And how might we mitigate potential harms 
associated with the complexity of neuroimaging data? We address 
these questions below by outlining three perennial ethical concerns 
raised in cases like that of Mr. R. We argue that—at least, in most 
cases—the	 benefit	 of	 assessing	 DoC	 patients	 with	 investigational	
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Weijer,	C.	(2016).	Assessing	decision‐making	capacity	in	patients	with	communication	
impairments: A case study. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 25(4),	691–699.
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31 Peterson,	A.,	Cruse,	D.,	Naci,	L.,	Weijer,	C.,	&	Owen,	A.	M.	(2015).	Risk,	diagnostic	
error, and the clinical science of consciousness. NeuroImage: Clinical, 7,	588–597.
32 Peterson,	A.	(2016).	Consilience,	clinical	validation,	and	global	disorders	of	
consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 1(1),	1–9.
33 Johnson,	L.	S.,	&	Lazaridis,	C.	(2018).	The	sources	of	uncertainty	in	disorders	of	
consciousness. AJOB‐Neuroscience, 9(2),	76–82;	Lazaridis,	C.	(2019).	Withdrawal	of	
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3  | WOULD NEUROIMAGING A SSESSMENT 
OF MR . R LE AD TO FAL SE HOPE?
A first ethical concern is that investigational neuroimaging could lead 
to false hope. False hope occurs when a person believes in a positive 
clinical outcome, but this belief is inconsistent with the clinical facts. 
False hope could occur as a result of therapeutic misconception.34 The 
guideline acknowledges that these neuroimaging methods are transi‐
tioning from the investigational setting to clinical practice, yet their 
evidence base still requires time to mature. Patients’ families might not 
appreciate the liminal state of the science and might be inclined to rea‐
son beyond the evidence. Families might also be aware of media re‐
ports, which in some cases may embellish the strength of neuroimaging 
in detecting covert consciousness or provide a misleading representa‐
tion of the quality of preserved consciousness in brain‐injured pa‐
tients.35 This could be harmful to both families and patients. It could be 
harmful to families in that they might already be emotionally vulnera‐
ble, and false beliefs could compound this vulnerability. False hope 
could likewise harm a patient in that the decision to withdraw life‐sus‐
taining therapies might be delayed based on the false belief that a pa‐
tient will recover.36
Investigational neuroimaging data are complex, and disclosure to 
patients’ families could result in a misappreciation of the results. The 
fact that any neuroimaging method demonstrates preserved con‐
sciousness	in	a	DoC	patient	does	not	imply	that	she	retains	a	full	suite	
of cognitive capacities, nor does it guarantee that she will recover 
these capacities in the future. Additionally, failure to appreciate un‐
derlying theories of consciousness, or the relative validity of different 
methods, might also facilitate false hope. Misappreciation of these 
facts can impair decision‐making and lead to harm.
Although investigational neuroimaging raises legitimate worries 
about the appreciation of results, it is far from obvious that disclosure 
of neuroimaging data would necessarily lead to false hope. There are 
currently no systematic studies on how patients’ families might inter‐
pret investigational neuroimaging data. Thus, while false hope could 
result from disclosure, it is equally plausible that disclosure could have 
no	influence	at	all.	In	a	study	examining	family	beliefs	regarding	DoC	
patients, Tresch and colleagues observed that, of 33 family caregivers 
for patients clinically diagnosed as being in a vegetative state, 90% of 
patients were regarded by caregivers as conscious even after the care‐
givers had been informed of the clinical diagnosis.37 These findings 
suggest that families might have strong beliefs regarding preserved 
consciousness	in	DoC	patients	and	that	these	beliefs	might	not	be	in‐
fluenced by new information.
Nevertheless, clinicians might still adopt precautionary mea‐
sures to mitigate false hope, where present.38 For example, there are 
currently no best practices for disclosing investigational neuroimag‐
ing	results	to	patients’	families.	Recommendations	8	and	15	of	the	
guideline describe the importance of counseling patients’ families 
with realistic expectations and evidence‐based language, but these 
recommendations do not provide specific guidance with regard to 
investigational neuroimaging. One approach to developing best 
practices might be to borrow methods for disclosing neuroimaging 
data in other neurological populations. Harkins and colleagues de‐
veloped best practices for disclosing investigational amyloid imaging 






with	 time	 for	 discussion;	 and	 (5)	 periodic	 follow‐up	 consultations	
should	occur.	Replicating	this	process	within	the	DoC	research	com‐
munity could be an important first step in identifying best practices 
for disclosure.
Guidance for disclosure might also be taken from discussion of 
genetic biomarker assessment for neurodegenerative diseases. In 
these circumstances, a genetic counselor might discuss a common 
genetic risk factor for Alzheimer’s disease, apolipoprotein E, in the 
context of pre‐clinical imaging results or tau protein accumulation. 
Genetic counselors are trained to translate this complex clinical in‐
formation for nonexperts. This can allow patients or families to envi‐
sion the scope of possible results and therapies, and it can enhance 
autonomous and authentic choice.
A member of the clinical team who is designated and trained 
to disclose investigational neuroimaging results could, by the same 
token, facilitate appreciation of the data. Such an individual might 
also be skilled in disclosing data in a way that reflects patient and 
family values. Recommendation 11 of the guideline states that, for 
chronic	 DoCs,	 clinicians	 should	 become	 familiar	 with	 patient	 and	
family	 preferences	 to	help	 guide	 clinical	 decisions.	 Some	DoC	pa‐
tients might develop complications years after injury, and families 
might	 need	 to	 choose	 between	 therapy	 and	 palliation.	 Disclosing	
investigational neuroimaging data in a way that is responsive to pa‐
tient values could assist families in finding meaning in the results 
while also forestalling false hope.
More empirical work is needed to determine whether disclosure 
of investigational neuroimaging results would lead to false hope. If it 
does, more work is also required to determine whether the develop‐
ment of best practices for disclosure or the designation of a family li‐
aison similar to that of a genetic counselor would mitigate false hope, 
34 Fins,	J.	J.	(2016).	Neuroethics	and	disorders	of	consciousness:	Discerning	brain	states	
in clinical practice and research. AMA Journal of Ethics, 18(12),	1182–1191.
35 Samuel,	G.,	&	Kitzinger,	J.	(2013).	Reporting	consciousness	in	coma:	Media	framing	of	
neuro‐scientific research, hope, and the response of families with relatives in vegetative 
and minimally conscious states. JOMEC Journal, 3, 1–5.
36 Kitzinger,	J.,	&	Kitzinger,	C.	(2013).	The	‘window	of	opportunity’	for	death	after	severe	
brain injury: Family experiences. Sociology of Health & Illness, 35(7),	1095–1112.
37 Tresch,	D.	D.,	Sims,	F.	H.,	Duthie	E.	H.,	&	Goldstein,	M.	D.	(1991).	Patients	in	a	
persistent vegetative state attitudes and reactions of family members. Journal of the 
American Geriatrics Society, 39(1),	17–21.
38 Graham,	M.,	Weijer,	C.,	Peterson,	A.,	Naci,	L.,	Cruse,	D.,	Fernández‐Espejo,	D.,	…	Owen,	
A.	M.	(2015).	Acknowledging	awareness:	Informing	families	of	individual	research	results	
for patients in the vegetative state. Journal of Medical Ethics, 41(7),	534–538.
39 Harkins,	K.,	Sankar,	P.,	Sperling,	R.,	Grill,	J.	D.,	Green,	R.	C.,	Johnson	K.	A.,	…,	Karlawish,	
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where present. Until these data are available, however, developing 
and adopting best practices for disclosure might reasonably improve 
a family’s appreciation of neuroimaging results and avoid potential 
harms.
4  | IS MR . R ’S LIFE WORTH LIVING?
A second ethical concern is that, even if families accurately appre‐
ciate investigational neuroimaging data, patients like Mr. R might 
be suffering intolerably. The use of investigational neuroimaging 
would not have any extant benefit. Rather, neuroimaging would 
only serve to keep patients like Mr. R alive, and this is inherently 
harmful.
This ethical concern stems from a technical philosophical argu‐
ment	 regarding	 the	 moral	 status	 of	 DoC	 patients.40 A being has 
moral status if and only if it is owed moral consideration for its own 
sake. A stone lacks moral status. It makes no moral difference to the 
stone if one maliciously kicks it or throws it into the Thames River. A 
person, by contrast, does have moral status, for it does make a moral 
difference to her if she is maliciously kicked or thrown into the 
Thames. Lack of moral consideration for this person results in harm, 
whereas no such harm occurs to the stone.
Consciousness plays a role in the ascription of moral status to 
a being. That a being is conscious implies that it might have the 
capacity to suffer, or to have pleasurable experiences, along with 
a range of other plausible capacities. With these capacities comes 
a range of moral duties. The fact that a being can suffer suggests 
that we might have a duty to prevent it from suffering, and to in‐
crease its chances of having pleasurable experiences. Some theo‐
rists argue further that beings can fall on a spectrum of moral 
status, according to which some enjoy full moral status and others 
do not.41 To have full moral status, a being must not only be con‐
scious, but it must also have sophisticated cognitive capacities 
that allow it to value its own life. These capacities include a sense 
of self over time and the capacity to develop life plans. Without 
these capacities, the continuation or cessation of life does not 
matter to the being. Although we may have a moral duty to con‐
sider the welfare of the being, it does not follow that we must also 
respect its right to life, especially if it is suffering.
DoC	 patients	 for	 whom	 investigational	 neuroimaging	 is	 re‐
quired to detect consciousness might lack the sophisticated cogni‐
tive capacities to value their own lives. It follows, according to this 
view, that they might also lack full moral status. Although it is im‐
portant to consider their welfare, there is no moral duty to keep 
these patients alive, for the continuation or cessation of their lives 
does not matter to them. Some argue further that the welfare of 
these patients is also very poor; so poor in fact that their condition 
has been likened to a state that is “far worse than that of someone 
in the worst form of solitary confinement,” even worse than death 
itself.42 Withdrawal of life‐sustaining therapies, or a do‐not‐resus‐
citate	(DNR)	order,	is	not	only	permissible	but	morally	required	to	
prevent further suffering.
This argument is consistent with the findings of several interview 
studies assessing clinician, scientist, and family attitudes toward 
end‐of‐life	 decisions	 in	 DoC	 patients.43 Respondents consistently 
report that they would recommend withdrawal of life‐sustaining 
therapies for others and themselves, particularly in the case of the 
vegetative state. Jox and colleagues also observed that of the 44 
family	caregivers	they	interviewed,	85%	reported	that	they	consid‐
ered limiting treatment because of patient quality of life. The above‐
reviewed	 argument	 thus	 reflects	 real	 attitudes	 of	 real	 DoC	
stakeholders. How should we respond to these concerns?
We think that there are good reasons to be skeptical of this argu‐
ment, as do other theorists working on this problem.44 First, it is 
unclear whether we ought to accept the presumption of a concep‐
tual relationship between full moral status and the capacities in‐
volved in valuing one’s own life. Theorists generally agree that 
consciousness plays a role in the ascription of moral status, but there 
is currently no consensus regarding which role, nor which capacities 
should be regarded as morally relevant. This is reflected in the way 
that we treat other cognitively impaired patients. There are many 
patients who lack the cognitive capacities necessary for valuing their 
own lives, yet we still treat them as though they have full moral sta‐
tus. By the moderate to severe stage of dementia caused by 
Alzheimer’s disease, patients lack the capacity to generate and carry 
out life plans. Should we therefore regard these patients as lacking a 
right to life? On the contrary, these patients still remain the focus of 
care and consideration from their families and clinical teams.
Second, even if we are inclined to accept the presumption of a 
relationship between full moral status and the capacities to value 
one’s own life, it is simply very hard to determine whether those ca‐
pacities	are	present	in	any	given	DoC	patient.	Indeed,	the	guideline	
explicitly	 states	 that	 preservation	 of	 cognitive	 capacities	 in	 DoC	
40 Kahane,	G.,	&	Savulescu,	J.	(2009).	Brain	damage	and	the	moral	significance	of	
consciousness. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 34(1),	6–26;	Levy,	N.,	&	Savulescu,	J.	
(2009).	Moral	significance	of	phenomenal	consciousness.	Progress in Brain Research, 177, 
361–370.
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patients is variable, and that recovery can occur years after injury.45 
Thus, from a strictly empirical vantagepoint, it is doubtful whether 
we	could	discriminate	with	high	confidence	which	DoC	patients	lack	
these cognitive capacities, and which do not.
Third,	it	is	unclear	whether	the	welfare	of	DoC	patients	is	so	poor	
that we are morally required to withdraw life‐sustaining therapy or 
stipulate	a	DNR	order.	To	date,	 there	are	no	data	on	 the	 subjective	
quality	of	life	of	DoC	patients.	However,	interview	studies	with	analo‐
gous clinical populations suggest that some neurological patients 
might not have the poor quality of life that we assume. In fact, it might 
be the opposite. A 2013 study examining 19 locked‐in‐syndrome pa‐
tients with vascular etiologies or end‐stage amytrophic lateral sclerosis 
and 20 healthy participants found comparable reports of wellbeing.46 
Quality	of	life	was	assessed	with	the	McGill	Quality	of	Life	Single	Item	
Scale	(MQOL‐SIS).	Results	showed	no	significant	difference	in	MQOL‐
SIS scores between patients and healthy participants.
A 6‐year follow‐up study of the quality of life of locked‐in‐syn‐
drome patients also demonstrated that their wellbeing remained 
stable over time.47 Thirty‐nine locked‐in‐syndrome patients with 
vascular etiologies completed baseline measure with the Anamnestic 
Comparative	Self‐Assessment	(ACSA),	which	measures	an	individu‐
al’s global assessment of quality of life. These data were compared 6 
years later with ACSA scores and the French Reintegration to Normal 
Living	Index.	Seventy	percent	of	respondents	(n	=	21)	reported	ei‐
ther stable or improved quality of life. Surprisingly, self‐reported 
wellbeing was not correlated with gradual increases in disability. 
Respondents who had more complications still reported stable or 
improved quality of life.
Caution should be taken when interpreting these results. The ex‐
perience of locked‐in‐syndrome patients is likely very different from 
that	of	DoC	patients,	not	least	in	the	capacity	to	be	aware	of	one’s	
condition, make sense of it, adapt, and communicate. Moreover, it is 
also plausible that some locked‐in‐syndrome patients do find their 
lives intolerable. After all, 30% of participants did not report stable 
or improved quality of life at 6‐year follow‐up. Nonetheless, these 
findings highlight two important facts. First, it may be problematic to 
make	claims	about	the	quality	of	life	of	DoC	patients	from	the	frame	
of reference of able‐bodied people. Making such claims results in a 
well‐known disability paradox, according to which the wellbeing of 
persons with disabilities is drastically underestimated by able‐bod‐
ied individuals.48 This provides good reason to be skeptical of claims 
made from the philosophical armchair regarding the quality of life of 
DoC	patients.
Second,	presumptions	about	negative	quality	of	life	in	DoC	pa‐
tients might not account for potential response shifts. A response 
shift is a change in an individual’s internal standards of quality of life 
in response to changes in health status.49 Prior to brain injury, an 
individual might intuit that she would not want to live in a state of 
profound	disability.	Yet	after	 injury	she	might	find	that	her	experi‐
ence contradicts her pre‐injury intuitions. She may, in fact, be able to 
carry out new life goals and plans.
To be sure, these insights must be tempered by their implications 
for advance directives. If the data suggest that people are generally 
bad at forecasting the kind of life they would value, is this reason 
enough to doubt the very legitimacy of advance directives? A thor‐
ough answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article, and 
several other theorists have explored this topic in detail.50 
Nevertheless, we would argue that, notwithstanding this conceptual 
puzzle,	a	genuine	understanding	of	how	DoC	patients	are	faring	and	
what clinical decisions they might favor requires that we understand 
their condition from their point of view.	Developing	methods	for	as‐
sessing	the	subjective	quality	of	life	of	DoC	patients	could	shed	light	
on this issue in the future.
Suppose, however, that the quality of life of most—if not all—
DoC	patients	is	in	fact	poor.	Is	this	reason	enough	to	presume	that	
the	 lives	of	DoC	patients	are	not	worth	 living	and	 that	 the	use	of	
investigational neuroimaging in these patients is inherently harm‐
ful? We think not. Although some will think that clinical decisions 
for	DoC	patients	 should	 turn	primarily,	 if	not	exclusively,	on	qual‐
ity‐of‐life considerations, we think that focusing narrowly on these 
issues overshadows the variety of reasons that families, clinicians, 
or other stakeholders may have for recommending continuation—or 
cessation—of life‐sustaining therapies. These reasons might stem 
from religious beliefs regarding the intrinsic value of life or suffering. 
Conversely, stakeholders might also conclude that care should be 
withdrawn, but not because a patient lacks moral status. Rather, it 
is precisely because a family and clinical team regard a patient as a 
moral person that her wish to die—expressed either presently or in 
an advance directive—ought to be respected.
What is apparent is that families are likely to make decisions 
that best reflect patient values only if all clinical information is made 
available to them, that they are sufficiently counseled, and that their 
views	are	respected.	(In	jurisdictions	in	which	clinicians	assume	de‐
cision‐making roles, neuroimaging information would likely also be 
helpful as it would allow clinicians to personalize treatment plans 
or	 to	 increase	 confidence	 in	 recommending	 withdrawal	 of	 care.)	
Unsurprisingly, this sentiment is consistent with the guideline’s 
recommendations, which place families at the center of the deci‐
sion‐making process. The information garnered from investigational 
neuroimaging would not deter from this process. Rather, it would 
enhance it.
45 Estraneo,	A.,	Moretta,	P.,	Loreto,	V.,	Lanzillo,	B.,	Santoro,	L.,	&	Trojano,	L.	(2010).	Late	
recovery after traumatic, anoxic, or hemorrhagic long‐lasting vegetative state. Neurology, 
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46 Rousseau,	M.	C.,	Pietra,	S.,	Nadji,	M.,	&	de	Villemeur,	T.	B.	(2013).	Evaluation	of	quality	
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5  | IS A SSESSING MR . R WITH 
NEUROIMAGING WORTH THE COST?
A third ethical concern is that investigational neuroimaging is not 
worth the cost. The methods outlined in the guideline are consistent 
with the U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act, which mandates 
costly neuroimaging infrastructures and personnel. Transportation 
of patients to a scanning unit could further compound these costs. 
Efforts have been made to translate neuroimaging methods to clini‐
cal scanners with some success,51 but the extent to which all recom‐
mended methods could be translated is unknown. Investigational 
neuroimaging tasks have also been adapted to high‐density EEG. 
EEG is less expensive than neuroimaging, yet it raises several other 
technical obstacles, such as decreased spatial resolution and suscep‐
tibility to movement artifacts. These issues raise not only ethical 
concerns about cost, but also practical concerns about feasibility, as 
not all healthcare facilities are capable of providing these services.
Long‐term	 care	 for	 DoC	 patients	 also	 raises	 cost	 concerns.	
Globally, it is estimated that 50 to 60 million traumatic brain injury 
cases occur annually, with an estimated international cost burden of 
U.S.$400 billion. In the U.S. alone, the annual cost of traumatic brain 
injury	is	estimated	at	U.S.$76.5	billion,	and	patients	who	require	hos‐
pitalization account for 90% of these healthcare costs.52	DoC	pa‐
tients raise further resource allocation considerations, as they often 
require prolonged care or specialized rehabilitation.53
Long‐term	care	for	DoC	patients	also	raises	complex	jurisdiction‐
specific policy issues. In nations without mandated healthcare cov‐
erage, access to long‐term care could be impacted by the often 
circuitous	recovery	pattern	of	DoC	patients.54 Likewise, in nations 
with	mandated	healthcare	coverage,	long‐term	care	of	DoC	patients	
could raise concerns about allocation of costly resources in contexts 
of resource scarcity. Even if the benefit of investigational methods is 
worth the initial cost, downstream auxiliary healthcare costs might 
still be difficult to justify.
A thorough analysis of the cost of investigational neuroimaging 
and	long‐term	care	for	DoC	patients	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	arti‐
cle. Still, concerns about cost might be addressed by one of several 
preliminary considerations. First, it is plausible that investigational 
neuroimaging would result in cost‐savings. These cost‐savings could 
extend to both immediate clinical care and long‐term management. 
For example, a 2004 study, which compared immediate versus de‐
layed	 computed	 tomography	 (CT)	 assessment	 for	 acute	 stroke,	
showed that accurate early diagnosis by immediate CT scans in‐
creased patient survival and reduced healthcare costs.55 The guide‐
line outlines a similar argument to justify the use of the consciousness 
modulating drug, Amantadine. Recommendation 14 states that 
faster recovery from brain injury with the aid of Amantadine “re‐
duces the burden of disability, lessens health care costs, and mini‐
mizes psychosocial stressors in patients and caregivers.”56 Using 
investigational neuroimaging to improve prognostic accuracy or to 
gatekeep rehabilitation could have a similar result.
Second, the cost of investigational neuroimaging might also be 
mitigated by “piggy backing” investigational techniques on clinically 
indicated scans. For example, Weijer and colleagues argue that, to 
adequately mitigate potential risks of neuroimaging research involv‐
ing acutely comatose patients, piggy backing an investigational 
study on a clinically indicated structural scan can decrease overall 
scanning time, decrease the amount of personnel required for scan‐
ning, and decrease the likelihood of serious adverse events while 
transporting participants to the scanning unit.57 Not only does this 
technique proportionally balance potential risks and benefits of re‐
search, but it also provides a plausible approach to combining treat‐
ments to reduce auxiliary healthcare costs.
Third, promising scientific developments in the use of high‐density 
EEG	to	assess	DoC	patients	might	serve	as	a	screening	measure	for	
more expensive investigational methods.58 Edlow observes that as‐
sessment	of	DoC	patients	might	be	organized	into	a	series	of	hierarchi‐
cal screening measures: first, a patient is assessed with a standardized 
clinical exam; second, a patient is assessed with high‐density EEG; and 
third, a patient is assessed with costly investigational neuroimaging.59 
This approach would allow clinicians to screen out patients for whom 
investigational neuroimaging is likely to be unsuccessful. EEG is far less 
expensive than neuroimaging, and can be brought to the patient’s bed‐
side, which could increase access and feasibility.
The above‐reviewed considerations might assist clinicians as they 
consider the immediate use of investigational neuroimaging in the 
clinical setting. However, investigational neuroimaging methods for 
DoC	patients—in	addition	to	other	novel	therapies—also	raise	deeper	
conceptual puzzles regarding their cost‐effectiveness. 
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Cost‐effectiveness analyses estimate the value of alleviating disease 
burden by comparing changes in quality‐of‐life against the price of 
the healthcare intervention.60 Thus, for example, the cost of investi‐
gational neuroimaging might be justified by estimating the quality‐of‐
life units gained from any given method relative to its cost. But this 
raises a puzzle. As we have argued in Section 4, determining the qual‐
ity	of	life	of	DoC	patients	is	difficult,	and	there	are	reasons	to	believe	
that we might underestimate their welfare. This technical difficulty 
might bias estimation of quality of life units, and negatively influence 
the validity of cost‐effectiveness analyses for this population. More 
broadly, cost‐effectiveness analyses themselves contain controver‐
sial assumptions about the relevance of welfare to healthcare policy. 
Why should improvement in quality of life be the central consider‐
ation for determining the cost‐effectiveness of investigational neu‐
roimaging—or	any	novel	therapy,	for	that	matter—in	DoC	patients?
One alternative to a welfare‐based approach to justifying the 
cost of investigational neuroimaging is instead to evaluate the 
method’s capacity to facilitate access to opportunity.61 
Interventions that facilitate access to opportunity allow patients to 
pursue their own conception of the good. This approach is attrac‐
tive because it leaves a patient’s conception of the good unana‐
lyzed. A healthcare intervention’s capacity to improve quality of life 
might satisfy the conception of the good for some patients. But an 
intervention might equally inform clinical decisions that support 
patient values that are orthogonal to standard views of quality of 
life,	such	as	continuing	treatment	in	a	DoC	patient	for	religious	rea‐
sons. The cost of investigational neuroimaging could be justified by 
an opportunity‐based framework in both such cases.
We think that investigational neuroimaging could facilitate access 
to	opportunity	for	DoC	patients.	As	the	guideline	highlights,	 investi‐
gational neuroimaging could function as a gatekeeper for continued 
rehabilitation, and it might also be used as a neural prosthetic, based on 
future technical improvements. Neuroimaging assessment could also 
inform clinical decisions that best reflect a patient’s values, even if pur‐
suing those values are inconsistent with standard notions of quality of 
life. Opportunity‐based frameworks for healthcare justice still require 
conceptual refinement, and further work needs to be done to thor‐
oughly	apply	such	a	framework	to	the	DoC	context.	However,	we	be‐
lieve that this is a promising avenue of future research to explicate the 
justice	claims	that	DoC	patients	(or	other	disabled	populations)	have	to	
investigational neuroimaging and other novel therapies.
6  | CONCLUSION
In this article, we have provided an ethical analysis of the benefits, 
harms,	and	costs	of	using	investigational	neuroimaging	to	assess	DoC	
patients,	consistent	with	the	practice	guideline	update	on	DoCs.	Our	
analysis is intended to highlight how changes in the clinical under‐
standing of consciousness can lead to complex and multifaceted 
ethical issues that cut across jurisdictions and healthcare systems. 
We have argued that, in spite of these ethical concerns, the benefits 
of investigational neuroimaging assessment likely outweigh potential 
harms and costs in most cases. Further, we have identified areas of 
future empirical and conceptual research, which could assist clini‐
cians and theorists in addressing these issues, particularly as investi‐
gational neuroimaging methods transition from the research setting 
to clinical practice.
To be sure, there will be cases in which the harms or costs of 
investigational neuroimaging outweigh benefits. Transporting a 
critically ill patient to an alternative medical facility for the sole 
purpose of investigational neuroimaging assessment, which may 
in the end be clinically uninformative, would likely not be justified; 
the patient could die and there is no extant benefit to neuroimag‐
ing assessment. Similarly, continued assessment of a patient with 
investigational methods despite consistent negative—or uninfor‐
mative—results might not be justified, for there is also no extant 
benefit to the continued cost of assessment. Nonetheless, for the 
majority	 of	 medically	 stable	 DoC	 patients,	 particularly	 patients	
like Mr. R for whom these methods are feasible, there seems to 
be a clear benefit to using investigational neuroimaging despite 
perennial ethical concerns. For these patients, investigational neu‐
roimaging could make a significant difference in the accuracy of 
diagnosis and prognosis, and that can inform consequential long‐
term care decisions.
The practice guideline update is a milestone in the history of 
neurology. Recommendations to use investigational neuroimaging 
methods are but one aspect of the guideline, and there is a need 
for further normative analysis of its rich content. We encourage 
continued debate on these issues. Bringing clarity to the underly‐
ing ethics of caring for brain‐injured patients can assist clinicians 
and healthcare institutions as they incorporate the guideline in 
clinical practice.
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